- Jun 7, 2019
- 5,285
- 18,227
- AFL Club
- North Melbourne
At the end of 2009, two rookie coaches took on senior roles. Ten years later, one had two premiership flags, the other resigned mid-season in frustration. What happened?
Apart from match day tactics, in a regulated competition like the AFL, it is list management that makes or breaks club strategy. If you look at the list management strategies for Richmond in the Hardwick era, and for North in the Scott era, three distinct differences emerge:
Go hard, early
At the end of his first year in charge at Richmond, Hardwick put his stamp on the Richmond list (much as Clarkson did at Hawthorn), making deep cuts to the group who played AFL games in 2010. Richard Tambling was traded to Adelaide, Andrew Collins to Carlton, and Dean Polo and Tom Hislop were delisted. All four of these played first team football in 2010, and along with them, Jordan McMahon was also delisted (who Hardwick conspicuously declined to select in a team that finished 15th). On the other side of the ledger, Hardwick started to bring in “his” players, Shaun Grigg (traded from Carlton) and Bachar Houli (via the PSD). Richmond definitely did NOT nail the 2010 draft (eg Reece Conca at 6, and not much else besides), but Hardwick had made a statement about where he was headed.
In comparison, perhaps gun-shy from Josh Gibson walking out as he took charge at the end of 2009, Brad Scott made no strong statement about his first team list at the end of his first year in charge. David Hale was traded out, but the only other ‘first team’ players to leave the club were retirements (Corey Jones and Leigh Harding). Trading in Ben McKinley as a Jones replacement (for pick 86) and Cameron Richardson (for pick 35) hardly sent a message to the rest of the group as to what was expected.
Trade quality draft picks to fill a need
The next year, 2011, Richmond showed the next theme in their list management – a willingness to give up quality draft picks for what they considered to be their type of player. Thus, Richmond gave up pick 14 for Steve Morris (who was tied to GWS). People would laugh at this strategy when it came to Shaun Hampson (pick 32 in 2013) and Chris Yarran (pick 19 in 2015), but probably gave up the giggles in 2016 when trading picks gave Richmond what would be the premiership edge the following year, in the shape of Dion Prestia (and pick 24 for pick 6 and a 2017 second rounder), Toby Nankervis (for pick 46) and Josh Caddy (for pick 24 and another). Significantly, Richmond still got value out of the draft for what they had left (Shai Bolton and Jack Graham).
In comparison, North have done nothing similar. The only first round pick traded out has been for Jed Anderson, and that was in effect more of a player swap, a first rounder coming back for Ryan Bastinac. The only ‘established’ players traded/drafted in have been for low grade picks (McKinley, Taylor Hine, Billy Hartung, Marley Williams etc). With the exception of Williams (and hopefully now Josh Walker), we’ve got what we paid for.
Free agency
The only free agents Richmond have taken were of the delisted variety, Taylor Hunt (2014) and Andrew Moore (2015).
The point of comparison with North is obvious. The club took ‘first mover’ advantage with del Santo, Waite and Higgins and nearly got to the mountain top, with successive prelim appearances. Thereafter, whatever the strategy delivered on-field, it was later offset by the reputational damage of failed bids (ie Martin, Gaff).
There’s probably no “one” way to success, but the differences between Richmond and North on these three dimensions helps explain why Hardwick is still coaching.
Apart from match day tactics, in a regulated competition like the AFL, it is list management that makes or breaks club strategy. If you look at the list management strategies for Richmond in the Hardwick era, and for North in the Scott era, three distinct differences emerge:
Go hard, early
At the end of his first year in charge at Richmond, Hardwick put his stamp on the Richmond list (much as Clarkson did at Hawthorn), making deep cuts to the group who played AFL games in 2010. Richard Tambling was traded to Adelaide, Andrew Collins to Carlton, and Dean Polo and Tom Hislop were delisted. All four of these played first team football in 2010, and along with them, Jordan McMahon was also delisted (who Hardwick conspicuously declined to select in a team that finished 15th). On the other side of the ledger, Hardwick started to bring in “his” players, Shaun Grigg (traded from Carlton) and Bachar Houli (via the PSD). Richmond definitely did NOT nail the 2010 draft (eg Reece Conca at 6, and not much else besides), but Hardwick had made a statement about where he was headed.
In comparison, perhaps gun-shy from Josh Gibson walking out as he took charge at the end of 2009, Brad Scott made no strong statement about his first team list at the end of his first year in charge. David Hale was traded out, but the only other ‘first team’ players to leave the club were retirements (Corey Jones and Leigh Harding). Trading in Ben McKinley as a Jones replacement (for pick 86) and Cameron Richardson (for pick 35) hardly sent a message to the rest of the group as to what was expected.
Trade quality draft picks to fill a need
The next year, 2011, Richmond showed the next theme in their list management – a willingness to give up quality draft picks for what they considered to be their type of player. Thus, Richmond gave up pick 14 for Steve Morris (who was tied to GWS). People would laugh at this strategy when it came to Shaun Hampson (pick 32 in 2013) and Chris Yarran (pick 19 in 2015), but probably gave up the giggles in 2016 when trading picks gave Richmond what would be the premiership edge the following year, in the shape of Dion Prestia (and pick 24 for pick 6 and a 2017 second rounder), Toby Nankervis (for pick 46) and Josh Caddy (for pick 24 and another). Significantly, Richmond still got value out of the draft for what they had left (Shai Bolton and Jack Graham).
In comparison, North have done nothing similar. The only first round pick traded out has been for Jed Anderson, and that was in effect more of a player swap, a first rounder coming back for Ryan Bastinac. The only ‘established’ players traded/drafted in have been for low grade picks (McKinley, Taylor Hine, Billy Hartung, Marley Williams etc). With the exception of Williams (and hopefully now Josh Walker), we’ve got what we paid for.
Free agency
The only free agents Richmond have taken were of the delisted variety, Taylor Hunt (2014) and Andrew Moore (2015).
The point of comparison with North is obvious. The club took ‘first mover’ advantage with del Santo, Waite and Higgins and nearly got to the mountain top, with successive prelim appearances. Thereafter, whatever the strategy delivered on-field, it was later offset by the reputational damage of failed bids (ie Martin, Gaff).
There’s probably no “one” way to success, but the differences between Richmond and North on these three dimensions helps explain why Hardwick is still coaching.