F-35 Joint Strike Fighter - Abbott agrees to buy more, more, more.

Do you agree with the Aus gov's decision to purchase F-35s?


  • Total voters
    42
  • Poll closed .

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"The government had not been made aware of a Monash University study commissioned by defence, which found the local benefits of the Hawkei were limited. The study found Thales would send most of its profits offshore in the long term, the job multiplier effect was relatively small and that the government faced a $452m premium for building the vehicles in Australia."

Mmm..
Hmm indeed, you can’t trust those French companies.
 

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The unit costs of the Eurofighter and Rafale made sure they were never in the conversation.

The F-15 was considered too expensive and outdated in comparison to the SH.

As the interim option, I agree that we made the right choice with the SH and under the circumstances, particularly when you compare costs, logistics and C4isr integration.

Agree to disagree about the sufficient range part, classic continental defence relies on defending our air-sea corridors which is far out to sea considering the geography of the approaches to Australia. In saying that, if we have enough re-fuelers and the F-35's make quick work of 4th generation jets, then range is largely a non-issue.

I agree with your points on the payload, on paper its largely on par with most 4th generation jets, but the aerodynamics and underwing more than make up any issues with the payload.

I misspoke before about dogfighting, I meant more so air superiority. It's a common complaint that the Russian jets are agile, but their electronics and radar are often considered 'dirty'.

The F-35's are somewhat underrated aircraft. It's electronics, payload and stealth capabilities make it a standout.

We are definitely preparing for area denial. ASW frigates, Air Warfare destroyers and large long-range tactical patrol submarines, all these suit an area denial continental defence stratagem.
What people dont get is that an f35 in a dogfight means they have failed.

F35s should be effectively clubbing blindfolded baby seals - thats what the mismatch should look like.

I see greens pollies waffling about wasted money because it cant dogfight and as a greens voter i want to scream.
 
Opposition navy admirals dont lie awake in bed having sweaty sleepless nights thinking about frigates.....
Depends how you look at things. Based on recent history and an optimistic hope that regional tensions will never move past the stage where the most dangerous thing in our waters is an Indonesian cruise liner (that actually started out as a fishing trawler), the submarines add no value at all.

But I'd rather be well prepared than optimistic.

It's a weird argument when you break it down, though. Kinda like saying you don't need car insurance because you upped the contents value in your house.
 
Opposition navy admirals dont lie awake in bed having sweaty sleepless nights thinking about frigates.....
Neither are outstanding options tbh, but frigates are of more use to Australia than conventionally powered subs. Plus, the high proliferation of Chinese PLAN submarines being commissioned, it does not hurt having additional anti-SW capabilities.
 
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Lets just put a ring of fire around our borders. We could put a gasline just under the waters surface and have a flame constantly burning. and remotely triggered land mines on the ocean floor too
 
Apparently the new version of the Collins is as good as the French design and significantly cheaper
The Evolved Collins replacement was originally shelved in 2015 because we did not want to go through the hassle of designing a new submarine. If you are talking about the new A26 being used as a bid for the Dutch Navy, then that is an interesting discussion. The current short range A26 submarine has not been built yet due to contractual and constructions issues, and it has a shorter range and endurance base than the current Collins submarines. The long-range version of the A26 is a complete unknown at this stage as is the Barracuda tbh as neither have completed the construction phase. We know the specifications of the Barracuda as the first three submarines are about to launch over the next two years and we have already invested quite a considerable sum on the Shortfin's, so we are better off sticking with them at this stage, not that I am a big fan of said submarines or conventionally powered submarines.


https://www.smh.com.au/politics/fed...mirals-call-for-a-plan-b-20181212-p50ls4.html
Retired Rear Admiral Peter Briggs and the three former commodores yesterday wrote to Scott Morrison calling for the “Son of Collins option” to be considered in case the French submarine design was found to be unsatisfactory. They warned the Prime Minister the decision to build the French submarines, known as Shortfin Barracudas, could leave Australia with just one new submarine in operational service in 2040. “We are writing to you about the Future Submarine Program, reflecting our profound concern about a lack of submarine capability in the future as well as with the excessive costs and risks of the program,’’ wrote the group, which included commodores Paul Greenfield and Terry Roach.


“We are strongly of the view that the government should evaluate a second option, at very low cost and without impeding the present approach. The alternative option, that we believe could be cheaper, quicker and less risky and offer a greater level of Australian industry participation, is to build an evolved version of the Collins class.’’

The former submariners called for an urgent study to be undertaken into developing the Collins option, which they say would save Australian taxpayers billions of dollars, be less risky than the French project and become operational years earlier.

Spot on criticisms, but the evolved version of the Collins class is still on the drawing board itself (re: Dutch-Swedish A26 long-range version design) and is still in the bidding process at the present stage, it has not even entered the construction phase. We are already up s*** creek without a paddle with the Shortfins; the only thing we can do now is to increase the release rate of Barracuda's to get them sooner than planned, but when does that ever happen with Australian defence procurement. The Evolved version would probably carry less risk than the Shortfin due to Australia's familiarity with the Collins design, but even if we change things up now, we will be waiting just as long, if not longer for our submarines. As for costs, I agree with the criticisms.


Lets just put a ring of fire around our borders. We could put a gasline just under the waters surface and have a flame constantly burning. and remotely triggered land mines on the ocean floor too
The problem is we nearly import all of our fuel from Singapore and aviation fuel from North East Asia, but I like the out there thinking.
 
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Neither are outstanding options tbh, but frigates are of more use to Australia than conventionally powered subs. Plus, the high proliferation of Chinese PLAN submarines being commissioned, it does not hurt having additional anti-SW capabilities.
Im for a mix of both.
 

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Fair enough, if you haven't already read Hugh White, I do recommend him if you are into conventional submarines. He has lead the charge in respect of Australia having a large submarine and general maritime fleet.

https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/49753/8/01_White_A_focused_force_2008.pdf

Babbage is an interesting person to read in this field. He goes all out in terms of a much larger ADF.
I do too.

Id like to see a lot more northern aboriginal folk in the reserves as well.

We cant rely on the yanks forever - we have to have a creditable force that can make life enough of a misery for an aggressor that they think twice.
 
I do too.

Id like to see a lot more northern aboriginal folk in the reserves as well.

We cant rely on the yanks forever - we have to have a creditable force that can make life enough of a misery for an aggressor that they think twice.
The problem is that we cannot achieve much with great power support, whether that be Great Britain, the USA or possibly China in 50 years time. We are reliant on American advanced technology, resupply, some intelligence (something we are more self-sufficient in), the bulk of our command and control systems, aircraft, design skills, maritime technology, advanced munitions (we don't produce any PGM's for our air force and most of our naval munitions come from the USA) and we are highly interoperable with US forces via C4isr.


Self-sufficiency is unattainable in Australia's case. We lack the R&D funding and base (public and private), our industries and manufacturing is inherently limited, our defence industry's primary customer is the small ADF, our defence exports are horrid, our defence funding is too limited to sustain even a high level of self-reliance and the investment required to have even a high level of self-reliance is a lot more than the $200 billion promised, not to mention the money needed to develop a wider R&D base.

To have high self-reliance, we need, in my opinion:

INDUSTRY:
We need to focus on funding dual R&D technologies (dual is civilian and military use, i.e. software/communications, etc), developing a sovereign strategic strike option (so we can dictate a more uniquely Australian strategy, i.e. long-range cruise missile production), decide which part of the defence industries we want to strategically keep (i.e. submarine/ship-building, repair, low-level ammunition, etc.) and let go (i.e. no military airplane production), stockpile more fuel and ammo, improve our fuel refining capacity and buy cheap off the shelf technologies that are not cost effective or good enough capabilities wise to build in Australia. (i.e. aircraft production).

CAPABILITIES:
Ideally, Australia requires military equipment that enables the area denial defence of Australia’s air and sea corridors as well as the capacity to effectively project force regionally in order to protect Australia’s extensive regional interests. Therefore, Australia needs a long-range sovereign strategic strike option, shore-based anti-ship missiles, which are currently being adopted, air defence, a larger surface fleet, light tanks as well as more transport aircraft, supply ships, refueling aircraft and a larger army for regional stabilization efforts.

The sovereign long-range strategic strike option allows more effective regional force projection, enables a long-range counterattacking option against enemy staging areas and enables us to attack strategic targets more effectively.

Area Denial is part of White's theory and a theorem I support quite strongly.

A second school of thought exists within Australian strategic thought. We term this defence strategy the ‘area-denial’ approach. Its most vocal advocate has been Hugh White (2012a), who draws his inspiration from maritime warfare and, in particular, ‘sea denial’. Area denial is conceptually similar to sea denial except that it operates across multiple domains, including sea, air and land. In brief, area denial seeks to deter an opponent by making it too unsafe for them to close within striking distance of the Australian mainland. It is assumed that an opponent will not send high-value assets, such as troop transports, aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships, into waters where there is a strong chance that they will be destroyed. Unlike anti-access denial, area denial does not seek to stop them from achieving their objective, only to deny the opponent the confidence to expose their high-value assets to a significant risk of being lost. Anti-access denial deters by convincing the potential attacker that their action is likely to be defeated. Area denial deters not through making an action impossible, but rather through making it too risky.
 
For a country our size we do have a rather large defence budget already. We're about 12th in the world, behind the large European powers like France, Germany and the UK, but ahead of Italy and Israel. For a country that does not face any immediate or imposing threat our spending is already quite high.

We could do better in terms of energy management, and build in some more national interest and security into public policy rather than just flog off all our natural gas cheap and import all out oil-based liquid fuels. I know the economists would argue about comparative advantage and so on, but not for energy.
 
The problem is that we cannot achieve much with great power support, whether that be Great Britain, the USA or possibly China in 50 years time. We are reliant on American advanced technology, resupply, some intelligence (something we are more self-sufficient in), the bulk of our command and control systems, aircraft, design skills, maritime technology, advanced munitions (we don't produce any PGM's for our air force and most of our naval munitions come from the USA) and we are highly interoperable with US forces via C4isr.


Self-sufficiency is unattainable in Australia's case. We lack the R&D funding and base (public and private), our industries and manufacturing is inherently limited, our defence industry's primary customer is the small ADF, our defence exports are horrid, our defence funding is too limited to sustain even a high level of self-reliance and the investment required to have even a high level of self-reliance is a lot more than the $200 billion promised, not to mention the money needed to develop a wider R&D base.

To have high self-reliance, we need, in my opinion:

INDUSTRY:
We need to focus on funding dual R&D technologies (dual is civilian and military use, i.e. software/communications, etc), developing a sovereign strategic strike option (so we can dictate a more uniquely Australian strategy, i.e. long-range cruise missile production), decide which part of the defence industries we want to strategically keep (i.e. submarine/ship-building, repair, low-level ammunition, etc.) and let go (i.e. no military airplane production), stockpile more fuel and ammo, improve our fuel refining capacity and buy cheap off the shelf technologies that are not cost effective or good enough capabilities wise to build in Australia. (i.e. aircraft production).

CAPABILITIES:
Ideally, Australia requires military equipment that enables the area denial defence of Australia’s air and sea corridors as well as the capacity to effectively project force regionally in order to protect Australia’s extensive regional interests. Therefore, Australia needs a long-range sovereign strategic strike option, shore-based anti-ship missiles, which are currently being adopted, air defence, a larger surface fleet, light tanks as well as more transport aircraft, supply ships, refueling aircraft and a larger army for regional stabilization efforts.

The sovereign long-range strategic strike option allows more effective regional force projection, enables a long-range counterattacking option against enemy staging areas and enables us to attack strategic targets more effectively.

Area Denial is part of White's theory and a theorem I support quite strongly.

A second school of thought exists within Australian strategic thought. We term this defence strategy the ‘area-denial’ approach. Its most vocal advocate has been Hugh White (2012a), who draws his inspiration from maritime warfare and, in particular, ‘sea denial’. Area denial is conceptually similar to sea denial except that it operates across multiple domains, including sea, air and land. In brief, area denial seeks to deter an opponent by making it too unsafe for them to close within striking distance of the Australian mainland. It is assumed that an opponent will not send high-value assets, such as troop transports, aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships, into waters where there is a strong chance that they will be destroyed. Unlike anti-access denial, area denial does not seek to stop them from achieving their objective, only to deny the opponent the confidence to expose their high-value assets to a significant risk of being lost. Anti-access denial deters by convincing the potential attacker that their action is likely to be defeated. Area denial deters not through making an action impossible, but rather through making it too risky.
Agree with all of this

Was absolutely incensed when the libs withdrew subsides to the car industry.

Idiotic and short sighted. A car manufacturing plant can become an armoured vehicle manufacturing plant in time of need. There are certain industries that are national need. We should never lose those skills.
 
Agree with all of this

Was absolutely incensed when the libs withdrew subsides to the car industry.

Idiotic and short sighted. A car manufacturing plant can become an armoured vehicle manufacturing plant in time of need. There are certain industries that are national need. We should never lose those skills.
Or our neglect of the merchant marine in the 1970s or the fact we have not produced a military combat jet since the Hornet, while we produced thousands of aircraft during the Second World War. We are partially to blame, but our natural geography, population and the sheer American domination of military technology globally, including cheaper off the shelf options, have made the situation the way it is. This is what I am writing my PhD on, that Australia’s defence procurement from the Americans has ultimately undermined Australian self-reliance and leaves them too interconnected with American rather than Australian interests. Interoperability is a blessing and a curse, it offers a lot tactically, but strategically it weakens our capacity to fight for our interests, including solving the China debate.
 
For a country our size we do have a rather large defence budget already. We're about 12th in the world, behind the large European powers like France, Germany and the UK, but ahead of Italy and Israel. For a country that does not face any immediate or imposing threat our spending is already quite high.

We could do better in terms of energy management, and build in some more national interest and security into public policy rather than just flog off all our natural gas cheap and import all out oil-based liquid fuels. I know the economists would argue about comparative advantage and so on, but not for energy.
We buy too many capabilities in line with what we think the Americans want. We bought the Shortfin because it enables the potential for a distant American blockade of China. All our frigates and destroyers have the American aegis system and are designed to act as a screening force for US naval task groups. We have designed our military to tactically support niche efforts with the Americans and have bought expensive defence equipment for American led campaigns, but a lot of it never sees service. We also think that we can buy enough capabilities to compete with the big powers, but also ward off smaller non-conventional threats. So we are buying all different types equipment for continental, regional and global defence doctrines, when in reality we can only fulfill one of those doctrines with the size of our military and defence funding. We try too much and it becomes very expensive, very quickly.

What we actually need is cheaper than what we have currently.
 
We buy too many capabilities in line with what we think the Americans want. We bought the Shortfin because it enables the potential for a distant American blockade of China. All our frigates and destroyers have the American aegis system and are designed to act as a screening force for US naval task groups. We have designed our military to tactically support niche efforts with the Americans and have bought expensive defence equipment for American led campaigns, but a lot of it never sees service. What we actually need is cheaper than what we have currently.

I can't argue much with that.

I think we should concentrate on area denial of the air-sea gap. More radar planes, lots of anti-ship missiles either air launched or land-based. Mobile mechanised infantry with lots of mobile self-propelled artillery support. So even if an enemy manges to land we can harass and weaken their advance over land.
 
I can't argue much with that.

I think we should concentrate on area denial of the air-sea gap. More radar planes, lots of anti-ship missiles either air launched or land-based. Mobile mechanised infantry with lots of mobile self-propelled artillery support. So even if an enemy manges to land we can harass and weaken their advance over land.
Thing to remember is a possible indo threat would be from thousands of small boats. A flotilla. Ask yourself why we are pretty much the only navy with guns still.

No point launching a millon dollar missile at a $500 boat.
 
Thing to remember is a possible indo threat would be from thousands of small boats. A flotilla. Ask yourself why we are pretty much the only navy with guns still.

No point launching a millon dollar missile at a $500 boat.

I think a thousand small boats would pose no threat whatsoever. They can't be armed with any serious offensive weapons, and even defensive weapons would be limited. They'd be sitting ducks even for trainer jets armed with a gun pod. If they got closer to shore they'd be sitting ducks for artillery from shore, closer still direct fire from tanks or IFVs, and if any did land they'd have only light infantry without any heavy weapons.
 
I think a thousand small boats would pose no threat whatsoever. They can't be armed with any serious offensive weapons, and even defensive weapons would be limited. They'd be sitting ducks even for trainer jets armed with a gun pod. If they got closer to shore they'd be sitting ducks for artillery from shore, closer still direct fire from tanks or IFVs, and if any did land they'd have only light infantry without any heavy weapons.
No to mention the issues with maintaining a healthy supply chain and dealing with the vast geography of Australia’s north. There’s a reason why the Imperialy Japanese Naval officers knocked back a full invasion of Australia.
 
I think a thousand small boats would pose no threat whatsoever. They can't be armed with any serious offensive weapons, and even defensive weapons would be limited. They'd be sitting ducks even for trainer jets armed with a gun pod. If they got closer to shore they'd be sitting ducks for artillery from shore, closer still direct fire from tanks or IFVs, and if any did land they'd have only light infantry without any heavy weapons.
Of course - but that gets your infantry over.

And that could move 100000 men overnight leaving your larger capacity vessels for heavy equipment.

And seeing as we dont have a bunch of tanks, artillery or ifvs lining the shore without good intel we could face an overnight threat.
 
Of course - but that gets your infantry over.

And that could move 100000 men overnight leaving your larger capacity vessels for heavy equipment.

And seeing as we dont have a bunch of tanks, artillery or ifvs lining the shore without good intel we could face an overnight threat.

We could easily fly a radar aeroplane over the north coast every morning to check for hordes of invading yellow bogey men. We could even buy a cheaper radar plane or two with just sea scanning radar without all the complex air combat stuff like the Wedgetails do.

EDIT: possibly BorderFarce already do such flights daily.
 
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