Review Positives and Negatives vs Gold Coast

[ShaunWCEFC]

Very similar to our performance against Brisbane in round 1 last year.

We can't control the conditions but we can control our personnel.

All well and good making changes up forward and down back. Trouble is, it was our midfield that got battered.

That's funny, we lost that game by 44 points aswell.

BL = 102 v 58

GC = 90 v 46

 

[RookiePick]

Get Dylan on a plane to QLD. Stat !

 

[Avalor]

It's a difficult one as the problems stemmed primarily from a combination of condition, attitude and structure rather than personnel.

Changes could be made, but they are unlikely to have the intended impact unless significant tactical changes are also undertaken as well.


The barometer with this team is numbers around contests, particularly between forward and centre.

From the mid-point of the second quarter onward Gold Coast were able to get far more numbers around stoppages and ground balls than West Coast could, with obvious results.

So the question to ask is why could the team not commit at least equal numbers to these situations?

Is it really just a lack of condition that is wholly to blame or is there something else underlying of far greater concern?


Unfortunately, there is a systemic component to this problem. There were valid reasons why the club did not win the premiership in 2019.

View attachment 893610

It is clear from the above that the team had the following shortcomings last year:

• Unable to apply pressure to opposition ball-carriers
• Unable to force opponents into making turnovers
• Unable to move the ball forward effectively when in possession
• Unable to win contests outside of stoppages

Each of those could be used to describe what happened against Gold Coast. It is the exact same theme all over again – after matches against the bottom two sides from last year, the signs are worrying:

View attachment 893612

But what are the mechanics behind these shortcomings that produce such underwhelming results?

2019 started with three 40+ point losses within the first six weeks. The possession-control gameplan was short-circuited by the static nature of the defence which allowed opponents to push non-key forwards up the ground, creating additional turnover pressure post-stoppage and avenues through which rapid counterattacks could be launched.

The band aid response from the team was to move its own non-key half forwards to a more defensive mindset, spending considerably more time up the ground in the defensive half. This served to stem the ease of opposition scoring, but restricted the options for offensive ball movement and further hampered the team’s ability to win contested situations outside of stoppages.

It was my expectation and hope that between 2019 and 2020 an actual solution would be implemented to address this issue, rather than continuing with destroying our offensive capability as a means of preventing cheap opposition goals. Alas, each of the preseason and two rounds played so far have suggested that nothing has changed from what we saw last year.

The aforementioned effect on attacking ball use has made the team far more predictable in its movement and opponents set themselves up to ensure that no one-on-one marking contests can occur from the expected kick down the wing to a tall target. Furthermore, this predictability has led to an increasing number of opponents fielding Richmond-style counterattacking setups through the midfield corridor in anticipation of the spoil from this contest.

With non-key position forwards curtailing their numbers of aggressive leads ahead of the ball, the onus is increasingly upon the tall forwards as targets in attack – but the predictable ball movement ends up making them play right into the hands of the opposition. Man up the target (usually ruck or third tall) in the corridor and it guarantees that the kick going forward from the defensive half will be towards the key forward that is leading up to the wing. Opponents are also well aware that this no longer represents a dangerous position; even if the ball is marked, if the small forwards are not getting into clear space and presenting a short option then the only means left to go into attack is to bomb it long in the direction of the remaining key forward. So what does the opposition do? Let the key forward roam up the ground, using the ruckman to check against his marking contests – allowing his defensive counterpart to stay at home as a marking spare. Thus, the ball can be marked, spoiled, roved, whatever – the only way it is getting forward is through a long, high kick to an outnumbered marking contest. From this point the opposition is able to generate counterattacks through superior numbers off halfback that negate the Eagles' defensive zone.

Think of all the easy out the back goals that were scored in 2018 - it was non-key forwards Cripps, LeCras and Ryan that were on the end of them, leading hard ahead of the ball to create that chance. We don't see out the back goals anymore because our small forwards are now coming from defensive positions behind the play when a counterattack opportunity arises.

Likewise, that play from the Grand Final wouldn't happen either - Ryan wouldn't be in position to provide an option for Vardy and take that mark; and Rioli would not be able to get far enough ahead of the ball to be able to put a block on Maynard.

On top of that we have a situation where the small forwards are being asked to become Mastens, running up and down the ground, guarding space one way and making leads the other – as you would expect they are tiring out and becoming less accountable as the match wears on – which creates a problem of the opposition backline being allowed to roam at will, further outnumbering the key forwards in attacking contests and adding more spares off the defensive side of stoppages to provide spread and move the ball quickly forward.

You see, the club does not have a premiership gameplan anymore. What it has is a Frankenstein’s monster of one instead: attempting to control possession but removing the avenues of attack; and acting to move players away from contested situations, giving the opposition ascendency through the middle of the ground.

Hence, we arrive at the current state where the team is only capable of scoring if it wins perfect, clean clearances.


So what should the club do in response to this situation?

The core of what needs to be done remains the same as was posted here over a year ago now. The club needs to be able to turn opposition extras high up the ground into a liability – it can do that through pressing aggressively.


More specifically, areas that can be improved upon are the following:

1. Get rid of the aerobic sweeper once and for all​

The hope was that the use of this role would be retired along with Masten, but disappointingly it has continued with detrimental outcomes to both the development of Brander and performance of the team overall. It is the most useless position in football today – wasting a selection for a role that negatively impacts the team. Those reasons have been previously detailed at length in this post.​

​

The first action that needs to be conducted as a priority is the removal of this role from the team.​

2. Backline mobility​

What started the rot in the first place in the beginning of season 2019? The static, stay-at-home nature of the backline allowed opponents to push extras up the ground for use in counterattacks. To address the source of these problems, the defence needs to become more flexible in its movement. Right away there are two players in McGovern and Barrass who are, for lack of a better term, aerobically challenged. Jetta and Hurn, now aged 31 and 32 respectively, could arguably also be considered within this group. It means the remaining members of the defence (namely Sheppard and/or Duggan, Nelson, Cole, Rotham) need to function a lot more like midfielders and get far higher up the ground to prevent those opposition extras from setting up and provide additional support through the middle. A problem the team has is that none of those options can provide any genuine pace in run and carry that can help break open opposition zones. If Petruccelle actually knew how to football he would be a great fit here. (Indeed if the club had made the obvious choice in 2018 with pick 23 rather than trying to get clever with pick swaps, we would already have Bobby Hill in this position and not be worrying that X.O’Neill and Foley are progressing nowhere rapidly). Without such an option, the best alternative is to find an aerobic tall who can provide necessary cover for McGovern and Barrass to allow the other three defensive positions to be rotated at a higher rate and meet the required aerobic output.​

​

There are just four options for this role at the club: Schofield, who himself is 31; Sheppard, at 187cm is far from key-sized; Rotham, who has less mass than Sheed; and Brander who has been criminally mishandled in his development.​

​

Ideally, rather than chasing shadows through the midfield, Brander would have been groomed in his progress towards a position such as this. What Gold Coast is doing with Lukosius is what this club should be doing with Brander.​

​

Regardless of whoever gets selected in this aerobic tall role, the key within the defence is to, as a unit, cover far more ground and operate far more in unison with the midfield.​

3. Stop sending the forwards back​

With non-key forwards spending so much time outside of attack, does it really come as any surprise then that the application of pressure on the opposition up forward has collapsed? Irrespective of personnel, just keeping these positions forward of centre will markedly boost the amount of pressure applied up forward and create more scoring chances from turnovers. Sounds crazy doesn’t it? Forwards playing up forward, imagine that.​

​

​

4. Free the wings​

The club went -37 for uncontested possessions against Gold Coast in a shortened match. Is it really any wonder when the wings are constantly deployed behind the ball, covering channels, rather than getting forward and providing spread? Let Gaff run into attack and cause some damage with his possession, unshackle Redden from whatever-his-current-role-is (tagging?) and put him back on the wing with an attacking mindset as occurred in September 2018.​

​

​

5. Intimidate​

There is no avoiding it – this West Coast team lacks the ruthless streak that dynastic teams have. Part of that ruthlessness is intimidation of opponents – daresay arrogance. A second-gamer took our midfield back to school; my question is why wasn’t he sat on his ass by someone before half time? The answer is because this team has a softness to it which frustrates me to no end. It should have been ball-up, block him in and bang, flatten him with the ruck from the other side (welcome to the big-league kid, you’re playing against a real team now). Great teams scare opponents before they are even on the ground – this team needs to get a nasty side and start physically imposing itself. And it needs to begin with Naitanui. The guy is far too nice, he needs to get dirty out there and make others fear him. He completely rag-dolled Witts early during that game, but was penalised for a free kick so never tried it again. Instead, he should have rag-dolled Witts again at the next stoppage, but this time throw him down hard into the deck and tell the umpire that is what a free kick looks like. Witts should have been worked over to the point of barely being able to walk by half time – and the Gold Coast midfielders should have been made very aware that if they try to invade a West Coast stoppage, then they will be hurt. This team lets opponents assert themselves too easily and it needs to stop.​

​

​

6. Stoppage tactics​

The setup of stoppages by this team (particularly those outside of centre square bounces) leaves a lot to be desired. They are typified by a distinct lack of movement and a lack of blocking to open players from their counterparts, in addition to almost no outside running support. The result is more often than not, when a clearance is won it becomes in an ill-directed dump kick that is easily intercepted by the opposition and creates a foundation for their counterattacking efforts. Considering that scores from turnovers are the number one source for points scored in the competition (even the bottom ranked team for points generated from turnovers in 2019 still had more than half of their total points scored from this source) and the competition overall is becoming progressively more geared towards “Richmond-style” setups outside of the stoppage, such reckless disposal resulting in turnover is becoming an increasing liability.​

​

With a dominant tap-ruckman providing first opportunity, there is no reason why aggressive runs through stoppages are not being undertaken at the very least as a decoy to pull opposing players out of position from where the tap ends up going. Furthermore, it defies me why, with Naitanui in the ruck as an addition to a strong midfield group, the club does not set itself to open up the front of the stoppage that would allow easy passage to attacking entry and goalscoring opportunity. Just put blocks on all opposing stoppage contestants placed on the Eagles’ attacking side of the stoppage; the tap goes over the back to a runner shadowing the ruckman from behind – and suddenly they have either an open channel to run through or a host of teammates ready to peel off ahead of them as handball options.​

​

The 6-6-6 rule should be enabling this team to dominate territory, yet that is not happening because the stoppage setup is simply not very smart.​

​

​

7. Midfield extras​

Any time you can dominate the midfield, it should be pursued wholeheartedly. The club has an excellent group of midfield ball-winners available – why not unleash and enable them to dictate the terms of play. Once again, it needs to get aggressive; I keep hearing the word “hunt” being used, yet keep seeing minimised numbers in stoppage attendance. You know what hunts best – a pack. At all times this team should be using the resources it has available to create outnumbered contested situations in its favour to overwhelm the opposition. Fielding an extra ball-winner around these contests maximises the impact of this midfield and places the opponent on the back foot immediately – either they are forced to commit additional resources to their own midfield (weakening themselves in other areas of the ground) or risk being dominated for first possession.​

​

There is no reason why this club with the personnel it has available cannot be consistently winning contested possession figures by 20+ per game with the correct application.​

​

​

8. Keep the full forward deep​

A lot is being said about Kennedy. Indeed, I remarked upon his decline (particularly late in matches) within the season preview. I am personally of the opinion that if West Coast had won the premiership in 2019 then Kennedy would have retired and right now probably be off the coast somewhere on a fishing trip with Lecras. That however does not mean that he is suddenly can no longer provide any use for the team. On the contrary, any player trying to hold down a key-position place in the West Coast forward line will probably encounter the exact same issues that Kennedy is struggling with right now. Poor ball movement, lack of support, lead-up space flooded and constantly double or triple teamed in contests – yet we still expect bags of goals to be somehow kicked.​

​

Tick off numbers 1-7 above and attacking ball movement will improve and suddenly the forward line will regain its fluidity and efficiency. Take it a step further and play the full forward (Kennedy) in a more traditional deep role. This aids in his preservation, but also stretches the opposition defence and helps to create space for attacking midfielders to lead into and exploit.​

​

The current issue the club has up forward is that Kennedy and/or Darling are the only options – and the opposition knows that. What needs to happen is for Kennedy and Darling to become just two options out of many that can be utilised, with the opponent unable to guard them all.​

Address each of these issues and you will have a completely different team in terms of output, despite having the same personnel.


For me though, it comes back once again to the question of what is the overall football philosophy of this team? How does the club itself want to play?

My fear is that the philosophy remains fixated upon creating opposition turnovers through intercept marking and that the club is now continuously setting up for an intercept mark that will never come.

If that is the case this will turn out to be a very frustrating season.

Great in-depth analysis. If you are not a coach, you should be.

 

[Wild Kelly]

Get Dylan on a plane to QLD. Stat !

Isn't he there already?

 

[DanWCE]

Dylan's back y'all!!

 

[Rowan18]

Great Analysis Dylan. I am depressed though. This season feels very much like a transition year similar to 2013/2017. Club is tipped to do well, stubbornly backs in a bad gameplan and won't change until writing is clearly on the wall and finals chances disappear.

The good news is we have a pretty talented squad with reasonable depth except for midfield. Means we won't just fall into a bottom 4 hole if we miss this season.

 

[SloppyJoe]

I wish I could go to a game, there is so much you miss watching on TV

 

[CM9000]

It's a difficult one as the problems stemmed primarily from a combination of condition, attitude and structure rather than personnel.

Changes could be made, but they are unlikely to have the intended impact unless significant tactical changes are also undertaken as well.


The barometer with this team is numbers around contests, particularly between forward and centre.

From the mid-point of the second quarter onward Gold Coast were able to get far more numbers around stoppages and ground balls than West Coast could, with obvious results.

So the question to ask is why could the team not commit at least equal numbers to these situations?

Is it really just a lack of condition that is wholly to blame or is there something else underlying of far greater concern?


Unfortunately, there is a systemic component to this problem. There were valid reasons why the club did not win the premiership in 2019.

View attachment 893610

It is clear from the above that the team had the following shortcomings last year:

• Unable to apply pressure to opposition ball-carriers
• Unable to force opponents into making turnovers
• Unable to move the ball forward effectively when in possession
• Unable to win contests outside of stoppages

Each of those could be used to describe what happened against Gold Coast. It is the exact same theme all over again – after matches against the bottom two sides from last year, the signs are worrying:

View attachment 893612

But what are the mechanics behind these shortcomings that produce such underwhelming results?

2019 started with three 40+ point losses within the first six weeks. The possession-control gameplan was short-circuited by the static nature of the defence which allowed opponents to push non-key forwards up the ground, creating additional turnover pressure post-stoppage and avenues through which rapid counterattacks could be launched.

The band aid response from the team was to move its own non-key half forwards to a more defensive mindset, spending considerably more time up the ground in the defensive half. This served to stem the ease of opposition scoring, but restricted the options for offensive ball movement and further hampered the team’s ability to win contested situations outside of stoppages.

It was my expectation and hope that between 2019 and 2020 an actual solution would be implemented to address this issue, rather than continuing with destroying our offensive capability as a means of preventing cheap opposition goals. Alas, each of the preseason and two rounds played so far have suggested that nothing has changed from what we saw last year.

The aforementioned effect on attacking ball use has made the team far more predictable in its movement and opponents set themselves up to ensure that no one-on-one marking contests can occur from the expected kick down the wing to a tall target. Furthermore, this predictability has led to an increasing number of opponents fielding Richmond-style counterattacking setups through the midfield corridor in anticipation of the spoil from this contest.

With non-key position forwards curtailing their numbers of aggressive leads ahead of the ball, the onus is increasingly upon the tall forwards as targets in attack – but the predictable ball movement ends up making them play right into the hands of the opposition. Man up the target (usually ruck or third tall) in the corridor and it guarantees that the kick going forward from the defensive half will be towards the key forward that is leading up to the wing. Opponents are also well aware that this no longer represents a dangerous position; even if the ball is marked, if the small forwards are not getting into clear space and presenting a short option then the only means left to go into attack is to bomb it long in the direction of the remaining key forward. So what does the opposition do? Let the key forward roam up the ground, using the ruckman to check against his marking contests – allowing his defensive counterpart to stay at home as a marking spare. Thus, the ball can be marked, spoiled, roved, whatever – the only way it is getting forward is through a long, high kick to an outnumbered marking contest. From this point the opposition is able to generate counterattacks through superior numbers off halfback that negate the Eagles' defensive zone.

Think of all the easy out the back goals that were scored in 2018 - it was non-key forwards Cripps, LeCras and Ryan that were on the end of them, leading hard ahead of the ball to create that chance. We don't see out the back goals anymore because our small forwards are now coming from defensive positions behind the play when a counterattack opportunity arises.

Likewise, that play from the Grand Final wouldn't happen either - Ryan wouldn't be in position to provide an option for Vardy and take that mark; and Rioli would not be able to get far enough ahead of the ball to be able to put a block on Maynard.

On top of that we have a situation where the small forwards are being asked to become Mastens, running up and down the ground, guarding space one way and making leads the other – as you would expect they are tiring out and becoming less accountable as the match wears on – which creates a problem of the opposition backline being allowed to roam at will, further outnumbering the key forwards in attacking contests and adding more spares off the defensive side of stoppages to provide spread and move the ball quickly forward.

You see, the club does not have a premiership gameplan anymore. What it has is a Frankenstein’s monster of one instead: attempting to control possession but removing the avenues of attack; and acting to move players away from contested situations, giving the opposition ascendency through the middle of the ground.

Hence, we arrive at the current state where the team is only capable of scoring if it wins perfect, clean clearances.


So what should the club do in response to this situation?

The core of what needs to be done remains the same as was posted here over a year ago now. The club needs to be able to turn opposition extras high up the ground into a liability – it can do that through pressing aggressively.


More specifically, areas that can be improved upon are the following:

1. Get rid of the aerobic sweeper once and for all​

The hope was that the use of this role would be retired along with Masten, but disappointingly it has continued with detrimental outcomes to both the development of Brander and performance of the team overall. It is the most useless position in football today – wasting a selection for a role that negatively impacts the team. Those reasons have been previously detailed at length in this post.​

​

The first action that needs to be conducted as a priority is the removal of this role from the team.​

2. Backline mobility​

What started the rot in the first place in the beginning of season 2019? The static, stay-at-home nature of the backline allowed opponents to push extras up the ground for use in counterattacks. To address the source of these problems, the defence needs to become more flexible in its movement. Right away there are two players in McGovern and Barrass who are, for lack of a better term, aerobically challenged. Jetta and Hurn, now aged 31 and 32 respectively, could arguably also be considered within this group. It means the remaining members of the defence (namely Sheppard and/or Duggan, Nelson, Cole, Rotham) need to function a lot more like midfielders and get far higher up the ground to prevent those opposition extras from setting up and provide additional support through the middle. A problem the team has is that none of those options can provide any genuine pace in run and carry that can help break open opposition zones. If Petruccelle actually knew how to football he would be a great fit here. (Indeed if the club had made the obvious choice in 2018 with pick 23 rather than trying to get clever with pick swaps, we would already have Bobby Hill in this position and not be worrying that X.O’Neill and Foley are progressing nowhere rapidly). Without such an option, the best alternative is to find an aerobic tall who can provide necessary cover for McGovern and Barrass to allow the other three defensive positions to be rotated at a higher rate and meet the required aerobic output.​

​

There are just four options for this role at the club: Schofield, who himself is 31; Sheppard, at 187cm is far from key-sized; Rotham, who has less mass than Sheed; and Brander who has been criminally mishandled in his development.​

​

Ideally, rather than chasing shadows through the midfield, Brander would have been groomed in his progress towards a position such as this. What Gold Coast is doing with Lukosius is what this club should be doing with Brander.​

​

Regardless of whoever gets selected in this aerobic tall role, the key within the defence is to, as a unit, cover far more ground and operate far more in unison with the midfield.​

3. Stop sending the forwards back​

With non-key forwards spending so much time outside of attack, does it really come as any surprise then that the application of pressure on the opposition up forward has collapsed? Irrespective of personnel, just keeping these positions forward of centre will markedly boost the amount of pressure applied up forward and create more scoring chances from turnovers. Sounds crazy doesn’t it? Forwards playing up forward, imagine that.​

​

​

4. Free the wings​

The club went -37 for uncontested possessions against Gold Coast in a shortened match. Is it really any wonder when the wings are constantly deployed behind the ball, covering channels, rather than getting forward and providing spread? Let Gaff run into attack and cause some damage with his possession, unshackle Redden from whatever-his-current-role-is (tagging?) and put him back on the wing with an attacking mindset as occurred in September 2018.​

​

​

5. Intimidate​

There is no avoiding it – this West Coast team lacks the ruthless streak that dynastic teams have. Part of that ruthlessness is intimidation of opponents – daresay arrogance. A second-gamer took our midfield back to school; my question is why wasn’t he sat on his ass by someone before half time? The answer is because this team has a softness to it which frustrates me to no end. It should have been ball-up, block him in and bang, flatten him with the ruck from the other side (welcome to the big-league kid, you’re playing against a real team now). Great teams scare opponents before they are even on the ground – this team needs to get a nasty side and start physically imposing itself. And it needs to begin with Naitanui. The guy is far too nice, he needs to get dirty out there and make others fear him. He completely rag-dolled Witts early during that game, but was penalised for a free kick so never tried it again. Instead, he should have rag-dolled Witts again at the next stoppage, but this time throw him down hard into the deck and tell the umpire that is what a free kick looks like. Witts should have been worked over to the point of barely being able to walk by half time – and the Gold Coast midfielders should have been made very aware that if they try to invade a West Coast stoppage, then they will be hurt. This team lets opponents assert themselves too easily and it needs to stop.​

​

​

6. Stoppage tactics​

The setup of stoppages by this team (particularly those outside of centre square bounces) leaves a lot to be desired. They are typified by a distinct lack of movement and a lack of blocking to open players from their counterparts, in addition to almost no outside running support. The result is more often than not, when a clearance is won it becomes in an ill-directed dump kick that is easily intercepted by the opposition and creates a foundation for their counterattacking efforts. Considering that scores from turnovers are the number one source for points scored in the competition (even the bottom ranked team for points generated from turnovers in 2019 still had more than half of their total points scored from this source) and the competition overall is becoming progressively more geared towards “Richmond-style” setups outside of the stoppage, such reckless disposal resulting in turnover is becoming an increasing liability.​

​

With a dominant tap-ruckman providing first opportunity, there is no reason why aggressive runs through stoppages are not being undertaken at the very least as a decoy to pull opposing players out of position from where the tap ends up going. Furthermore, it defies me why, with Naitanui in the ruck as an addition to a strong midfield group, the club does not set itself to open up the front of the stoppage that would allow easy passage to attacking entry and goalscoring opportunity. Just put blocks on all opposing stoppage contestants placed on the Eagles’ attacking side of the stoppage; the tap goes over the back to a runner shadowing the ruckman from behind – and suddenly they have either an open channel to run through or a host of teammates ready to peel off ahead of them as handball options.​

​

The 6-6-6 rule should be enabling this team to dominate territory, yet that is not happening because the stoppage setup is simply not very smart.​

​

​

7. Midfield extras​

Any time you can dominate the midfield, it should be pursued wholeheartedly. The club has an excellent group of midfield ball-winners available – why not unleash and enable them to dictate the terms of play. Once again, it needs to get aggressive; I keep hearing the word “hunt” being used, yet keep seeing minimised numbers in stoppage attendance. You know what hunts best – a pack. At all times this team should be using the resources it has available to create outnumbered contested situations in its favour to overwhelm the opposition. Fielding an extra ball-winner around these contests maximises the impact of this midfield and places the opponent on the back foot immediately – either they are forced to commit additional resources to their own midfield (weakening themselves in other areas of the ground) or risk being dominated for first possession.​

​

There is no reason why this club with the personnel it has available cannot be consistently winning contested possession figures by 20+ per game with the correct application.​

​

​

8. Keep the full forward deep​

A lot is being said about Kennedy. Indeed, I remarked upon his decline (particularly late in matches) within the season preview. I am personally of the opinion that if West Coast had won the premiership in 2019 then Kennedy would have retired and right now probably be off the coast somewhere on a fishing trip with Lecras. That however does not mean that he is suddenly can no longer provide any use for the team. On the contrary, any player trying to hold down a key-position place in the West Coast forward line will probably encounter the exact same issues that Kennedy is struggling with right now. Poor ball movement, lack of support, lead-up space flooded and constantly double or triple teamed in contests – yet we still expect bags of goals to be somehow kicked.​

​

Tick off numbers 1-7 above and attacking ball movement will improve and suddenly the forward line will regain its fluidity and efficiency. Take it a step further and play the full forward (Kennedy) in a more traditional deep role. This aids in his preservation, but also stretches the opposition defence and helps to create space for attacking midfielders to lead into and exploit.​

​

The current issue the club has up forward is that Kennedy and/or Darling are the only options – and the opposition knows that. What needs to happen is for Kennedy and Darling to become just two options out of many that can be utilised, with the opponent unable to guard them all.​

Address each of these issues and you will have a completely different team in terms of output, despite having the same personnel.


For me though, it comes back once again to the question of what is the overall football philosophy of this team? How does the club itself want to play?

My fear is that the philosophy remains fixated upon creating opposition turnovers through intercept marking and that the club is now continuously setting up for an intercept mark that will never come.

If that is the case this will turn out to be a very frustrating season.

Just some comments on your points:
* It’s easier said then done to get the defence to operate as you suggest. Adding an aerobic role and further rotations to the current set up which, really, is already a tad bit complicated, adds more variables that the players have to keep track of. The simple fact is that we’ve been deploying a method that is now ingrained into their minds, to the point that it’s second nature (which is how it should be), but adding to that takes more than just a slight adjustment - employing a new dedicated role and changing the rotations accordingly (which, presumably, would increase) is a structural change. It wouldn’t be a matter of bringing in a different player and the results (higher unity with the midfield and better ground coverage) coming as a matter of course - more needs to be adjusted to allow that to happen.
* I agree overall that we should be more attacking, but I don’t think it’s fair to criticise us for softness. We played that way with Nic in early 2018, and he got suspended in the most bullshit way possible. I want to see that style, and every fan loves seeing it, but the comp is currently trying to clamp down on things that might result in injuries - the reason Nic stopped against the Suns is that he’d likely be penalised and watched more closely. You can‘t blame us when the MRP, with the same person in charge, has shown a willingness to play favourites with people. The results speak for themselves - that shouldn’t deter us, really, but keep that in mind when players pull off a bit.

I agree broadly though, and we should be far more attacking with the best midfield we’ve had in 12 years.

 

[RookiePick]

Just some comments on your points:
* It’s easier said then done to get the defence to operate as you suggest. Adding an aerobic role and further rotations to the current set up which, really, is already a tad bit complicated, adds more variables that the players have to keep track of. The simple fact is that we’ve been deploying a method that is now ingrained into their minds, to the point that it’s second nature (which is how it should be), but adding to that takes more than just a slight adjustment - employing a new dedicated role and changing the rotations accordingly (which, presumably, would increase) is a structural change. It wouldn’t be a matter of bringing in a different player and the results (higher unity with the midfield and better ground coverage) coming as a matter of course - more needs to be adjusted to allow that to happen.
* I agree overall that we should be more attacking, but I don’t think it’s fair to criticise us for softness. We played that way with Nic in early 2018, and he got suspended in the most bullshit way possible. I want to see that style, and every fan loves seeing it, but the comp is currently trying to clamp down on things that might result in injuries - the reason Nic stopped against the Suns is that he’d likely be penalised and watched more closely. You can‘t blame us when the MRP, with the same person in charge, has shown a willingness to play favourites with people. The results speak for themselves - that shouldn’t deter us, really, but keep that in mind when players pull off a bit.

I agree broadly though, and we should be far more attacking with the best midfield we’ve had in 12 years.

Other clubs play a far more physical brand than us and don't rack up any great number more suspensions than we do.

The boys need to find a hard edge and push close to it if they want to ascend the mountain again.

 

[FKASC]

Has Redden played a good game since 2018? Duggan?

 

[ziad]

Has Redden played a good game since 2018? Duggan?

I though both were in our best 5-8.

 

[wc_eagles_since86]

It's a difficult one as the problems stemmed primarily from a combination of condition, attitude and structure rather than personnel.

Changes could be made, but they are unlikely to have the intended impact unless significant tactical changes are also undertaken as well.


The barometer with this team is numbers around contests, particularly between forward and centre.

From the mid-point of the second quarter onward Gold Coast were able to get far more numbers around stoppages and ground balls than West Coast could, with obvious results.

So the question to ask is why could the team not commit at least equal numbers to these situations?

Is it really just a lack of condition that is wholly to blame or is there something else underlying of far greater concern?


Unfortunately, there is a systemic component to this problem. There were valid reasons why the club did not win the premiership in 2019.

View attachment 893610

It is clear from the above that the team had the following shortcomings last year:

• Unable to apply pressure to opposition ball-carriers
• Unable to force opponents into making turnovers
• Unable to move the ball forward effectively when in possession
• Unable to win contests outside of stoppages

Each of those could be used to describe what happened against Gold Coast. It is the exact same theme all over again – after matches against the bottom two sides from last year, the signs are worrying:

View attachment 893612

But what are the mechanics behind these shortcomings that produce such underwhelming results?

2019 started with three 40+ point losses within the first six weeks. The possession-control gameplan was short-circuited by the static nature of the defence which allowed opponents to push non-key forwards up the ground, creating additional turnover pressure post-stoppage and avenues through which rapid counterattacks could be launched.

The band aid response from the team was to move its own non-key half forwards to a more defensive mindset, spending considerably more time up the ground in the defensive half. This served to stem the ease of opposition scoring, but restricted the options for offensive ball movement and further hampered the team’s ability to win contested situations outside of stoppages.

It was my expectation and hope that between 2019 and 2020 an actual solution would be implemented to address this issue, rather than continuing with destroying our offensive capability as a means of preventing cheap opposition goals. Alas, each of the preseason and two rounds played so far have suggested that nothing has changed from what we saw last year.

The aforementioned effect on attacking ball use has made the team far more predictable in its movement and opponents set themselves up to ensure that no one-on-one marking contests can occur from the expected kick down the wing to a tall target. Furthermore, this predictability has led to an increasing number of opponents fielding Richmond-style counterattacking setups through the midfield corridor in anticipation of the spoil from this contest.

With non-key position forwards curtailing their numbers of aggressive leads ahead of the ball, the onus is increasingly upon the tall forwards as targets in attack – but the predictable ball movement ends up making them play right into the hands of the opposition. Man up the target (usually ruck or third tall) in the corridor and it guarantees that the kick going forward from the defensive half will be towards the key forward that is leading up to the wing. Opponents are also well aware that this no longer represents a dangerous position; even if the ball is marked, if the small forwards are not getting into clear space and presenting a short option then the only means left to go into attack is to bomb it long in the direction of the remaining key forward. So what does the opposition do? Let the key forward roam up the ground, using the ruckman to check against his marking contests – allowing his defensive counterpart to stay at home as a marking spare. Thus, the ball can be marked, spoiled, roved, whatever – the only way it is getting forward is through a long, high kick to an outnumbered marking contest. From this point the opposition is able to generate counterattacks through superior numbers off halfback that negate the Eagles' defensive zone.

Think of all the easy out the back goals that were scored in 2018 - it was non-key forwards Cripps, LeCras and Ryan that were on the end of them, leading hard ahead of the ball to create that chance. We don't see out the back goals anymore because our small forwards are now coming from defensive positions behind the play when a counterattack opportunity arises.

Likewise, that play from the Grand Final wouldn't happen either - Ryan wouldn't be in position to provide an option for Vardy and take that mark; and Rioli would not be able to get far enough ahead of the ball to be able to put a block on Maynard.

On top of that we have a situation where the small forwards are being asked to become Mastens, running up and down the ground, guarding space one way and making leads the other – as you would expect they are tiring out and becoming less accountable as the match wears on – which creates a problem of the opposition backline being allowed to roam at will, further outnumbering the key forwards in attacking contests and adding more spares off the defensive side of stoppages to provide spread and move the ball quickly forward.

You see, the club does not have a premiership gameplan anymore. What it has is a Frankenstein’s monster of one instead: attempting to control possession but removing the avenues of attack; and acting to move players away from contested situations, giving the opposition ascendency through the middle of the ground.

Hence, we arrive at the current state where the team is only capable of scoring if it wins perfect, clean clearances.


So what should the club do in response to this situation?

The core of what needs to be done remains the same as was posted here over a year ago now. The club needs to be able to turn opposition extras high up the ground into a liability – it can do that through pressing aggressively.


More specifically, areas that can be improved upon are the following:

1. Get rid of the aerobic sweeper once and for all​

The hope was that the use of this role would be retired along with Masten, but disappointingly it has continued with detrimental outcomes to both the development of Brander and performance of the team overall. It is the most useless position in football today – wasting a selection for a role that negatively impacts the team. Those reasons have been previously detailed at length in this post.​

​

The first action that needs to be conducted as a priority is the removal of this role from the team.​

2. Backline mobility​

What started the rot in the first place in the beginning of season 2019? The static, stay-at-home nature of the backline allowed opponents to push extras up the ground for use in counterattacks. To address the source of these problems, the defence needs to become more flexible in its movement. Right away there are two players in McGovern and Barrass who are, for lack of a better term, aerobically challenged. Jetta and Hurn, now aged 31 and 32 respectively, could arguably also be considered within this group. It means the remaining members of the defence (namely Sheppard and/or Duggan, Nelson, Cole, Rotham) need to function a lot more like midfielders and get far higher up the ground to prevent those opposition extras from setting up and provide additional support through the middle. A problem the team has is that none of those options can provide any genuine pace in run and carry that can help break open opposition zones. If Petruccelle actually knew how to football he would be a great fit here. (Indeed if the club had made the obvious choice in 2018 with pick 23 rather than trying to get clever with pick swaps, we would already have Bobby Hill in this position and not be worrying that X.O’Neill and Foley are progressing nowhere rapidly). Without such an option, the best alternative is to find an aerobic tall who can provide necessary cover for McGovern and Barrass to allow the other three defensive positions to be rotated at a higher rate and meet the required aerobic output.​

​

There are just four options for this role at the club: Schofield, who himself is 31; Sheppard, at 187cm is far from key-sized; Rotham, who has less mass than Sheed; and Brander who has been criminally mishandled in his development.​

​

Ideally, rather than chasing shadows through the midfield, Brander would have been groomed in his progress towards a position such as this. What Gold Coast is doing with Lukosius is what this club should be doing with Brander.​

​

Regardless of whoever gets selected in this aerobic tall role, the key within the defence is to, as a unit, cover far more ground and operate far more in unison with the midfield.​

3. Stop sending the forwards back​

With non-key forwards spending so much time outside of attack, does it really come as any surprise then that the application of pressure on the opposition up forward has collapsed? Irrespective of personnel, just keeping these positions forward of centre will markedly boost the amount of pressure applied up forward and create more scoring chances from turnovers. Sounds crazy doesn’t it? Forwards playing up forward, imagine that.​

​

​

4. Free the wings​

The club went -37 for uncontested possessions against Gold Coast in a shortened match. Is it really any wonder when the wings are constantly deployed behind the ball, covering channels, rather than getting forward and providing spread? Let Gaff run into attack and cause some damage with his possession, unshackle Redden from whatever-his-current-role-is (tagging?) and put him back on the wing with an attacking mindset as occurred in September 2018.​

​

​

5. Intimidate​

There is no avoiding it – this West Coast team lacks the ruthless streak that dynastic teams have. Part of that ruthlessness is intimidation of opponents – daresay arrogance. A second-gamer took our midfield back to school; my question is why wasn’t he sat on his ass by someone before half time? The answer is because this team has a softness to it which frustrates me to no end. It should have been ball-up, block him in and bang, flatten him with the ruck from the other side (welcome to the big-league kid, you’re playing against a real team now). Great teams scare opponents before they are even on the ground – this team needs to get a nasty side and start physically imposing itself. And it needs to begin with Naitanui. The guy is far too nice, he needs to get dirty out there and make others fear him. He completely rag-dolled Witts early during that game, but was penalised for a free kick so never tried it again. Instead, he should have rag-dolled Witts again at the next stoppage, but this time throw him down hard into the deck and tell the umpire that is what a free kick looks like. Witts should have been worked over to the point of barely being able to walk by half time – and the Gold Coast midfielders should have been made very aware that if they try to invade a West Coast stoppage, then they will be hurt. This team lets opponents assert themselves too easily and it needs to stop.​

​

​

6. Stoppage tactics​

The setup of stoppages by this team (particularly those outside of centre square bounces) leaves a lot to be desired. They are typified by a distinct lack of movement and a lack of blocking to open players from their counterparts, in addition to almost no outside running support. The result is more often than not, when a clearance is won it becomes in an ill-directed dump kick that is easily intercepted by the opposition and creates a foundation for their counterattacking efforts. Considering that scores from turnovers are the number one source for points scored in the competition (even the bottom ranked team for points generated from turnovers in 2019 still had more than half of their total points scored from this source) and the competition overall is becoming progressively more geared towards “Richmond-style” setups outside of the stoppage, such reckless disposal resulting in turnover is becoming an increasing liability.​

​

With a dominant tap-ruckman providing first opportunity, there is no reason why aggressive runs through stoppages are not being undertaken at the very least as a decoy to pull opposing players out of position from where the tap ends up going. Furthermore, it defies me why, with Naitanui in the ruck as an addition to a strong midfield group, the club does not set itself to open up the front of the stoppage that would allow easy passage to attacking entry and goalscoring opportunity. Just put blocks on all opposing stoppage contestants placed on the Eagles’ attacking side of the stoppage; the tap goes over the back to a runner shadowing the ruckman from behind – and suddenly they have either an open channel to run through or a host of teammates ready to peel off ahead of them as handball options.​

​

The 6-6-6 rule should be enabling this team to dominate territory, yet that is not happening because the stoppage setup is simply not very smart.​

​

​

7. Midfield extras​

Any time you can dominate the midfield, it should be pursued wholeheartedly. The club has an excellent group of midfield ball-winners available – why not unleash and enable them to dictate the terms of play. Once again, it needs to get aggressive; I keep hearing the word “hunt” being used, yet keep seeing minimised numbers in stoppage attendance. You know what hunts best – a pack. At all times this team should be using the resources it has available to create outnumbered contested situations in its favour to overwhelm the opposition. Fielding an extra ball-winner around these contests maximises the impact of this midfield and places the opponent on the back foot immediately – either they are forced to commit additional resources to their own midfield (weakening themselves in other areas of the ground) or risk being dominated for first possession.​

​

There is no reason why this club with the personnel it has available cannot be consistently winning contested possession figures by 20+ per game with the correct application.​

​

​

8. Keep the full forward deep​

A lot is being said about Kennedy. Indeed, I remarked upon his decline (particularly late in matches) within the season preview. I am personally of the opinion that if West Coast had won the premiership in 2019 then Kennedy would have retired and right now probably be off the coast somewhere on a fishing trip with Lecras. That however does not mean that he is suddenly can no longer provide any use for the team. On the contrary, any player trying to hold down a key-position place in the West Coast forward line will probably encounter the exact same issues that Kennedy is struggling with right now. Poor ball movement, lack of support, lead-up space flooded and constantly double or triple teamed in contests – yet we still expect bags of goals to be somehow kicked.​

​

Tick off numbers 1-7 above and attacking ball movement will improve and suddenly the forward line will regain its fluidity and efficiency. Take it a step further and play the full forward (Kennedy) in a more traditional deep role. This aids in his preservation, but also stretches the opposition defence and helps to create space for attacking midfielders to lead into and exploit.​

​

The current issue the club has up forward is that Kennedy and/or Darling are the only options – and the opposition knows that. What needs to happen is for Kennedy and Darling to become just two options out of many that can be utilised, with the opponent unable to guard them all.​

Address each of these issues and you will have a completely different team in terms of output, despite having the same personnel.


For me though, it comes back once again to the question of what is the overall football philosophy of this team? How does the club itself want to play?

My fear is that the philosophy remains fixated upon creating opposition turnovers through intercept marking and that the club is now continuously setting up for an intercept mark that will never come.

If that is the case this will turn out to be a very frustrating season.

Why are you not coaching and advising? This summarises in such awesome detail what a layman like myself can see (in really really really broad detail).

Secondly, how are they missing this do you think? Is it just a case of philosophy in the player's rooms / HQ rooms?

 

[swingdog]

Ideally Brander would not be on a wing, but having an ineffective wingman does not excuse the rest of the midfield.

I am not saying that Kennedy will ever be at his peak again. However, I don't think he was as bad as is being made out.

Why aren’t we playing Waterman on a wing? He’s got as much tank as Brander.

 

[FKASC]

I though both were in our best 5-8.

I should have said ‘match winning’ instead of good.

 

[CM9000]

Other clubs play a far more physical brand than us and don't rack up any great number more suspensions than we do.

The boys need to find a hard edge and push close to it if they want to ascend the mountain again.

That would be true, if it was an equal playing field. Unfortunately, it isn’t, and we’ve already seen how the MRP approaches things. Just look at GAJ last year.

 

[Avalor]

That would be true, if it was an equal playing field. Unfortunately, it isn’t, and we’ve already seen how the MRP approaches things. Just look at GAJ last year.

GAJ last year was a disgrace.

 

[Dark Sharks]

Has Redden played a good game since 2018? Duggan?

Duggan is ridiculously overrated on this board. Probably even more so now he's got a mullet.

He's our 6th best defender FFS, and has only just won that spot back after losing it to Cole/Nelson of all people in 2019.

 

[amazingjoshy]

Other clubs play a far more physical brand than us and don't rack up any great number more suspensions than we do.

The boys need to find a hard edge and push close to it if they want to ascend the mountain again.

I don't think it's a fear of suspension thing. I think it's the way Simmo prefers us to play.

The Adelaide game over there last year we had 100 tackles in relatively sloppy conditions and after being down about 5 goals. I remember Simmo a few times that following week mentioning that tackles aren't a stat that's important to us, and saying that sort of footy isn't really sustainable over a whole season.

We maybe need to throw that thinking out the window for this month in the hub given the conditions.

 

[kerr87]

I don't think it's a fear of suspension thing. I think it's the way Simmo prefers us to play.

The Adelaide game over there last year we had 100 tackles in relatively sloppy conditions and after being down about 5 goals. I remember Simmo a few times that following week mentioning that tackles aren't a stat that's important to us, and saying that sort of footy isn't really sustainable over a whole season.

We maybe need to throw that thinking out the window for this month in the hub given the conditions.

We're still focused on corralling/zoning as opposed to making contact and tackling.

Bruise free chip-kick back and forth slow movement.

When it works against crap opposition in perfect conditions for kicking and marking it looks a million bucks but we need to adapt and change oir method or 2019 will repeat.

 

[FKASC]

Duggan is ridiculously overrated on this board. Probably even more so now he's got a mullet.

He's our 6th best defender FFS, and has only just won that spot back after losing it to Cole/Nelson of all people in 2019.

Yeah he’s a first round pick in his 6th year. Should really be imposing himself on games now. Bit disappointing

 

[wce4premiership]

Duggan is ridiculously overrated on this board. Probably even more so now he's got a mullet.

He's our 6th best defender FFS, and has only just won that spot back after losing it to Cole/Nelson of all people in 2019.

He's the only tough nut we have down there that looks like he sometimes wants do hurt someone.

Hurn should be dropping people every game but he never asserts himself in that way.

Ryan is the only other person on this team that sometimes looks to bump and delivers it well. I think Cole and Duggan make a great partnership down back, when the ball hits the deck they are the two I wan't there. They will run through people to get the ball. They're mostly durable, agile enough, capable of good kicks and compliment the aerial prowess of Shep, Gov, Barrass etc.

Defenders are normally the least likely in a team to be hugely talented players, that's why they're defenders more often than not.
I like Duggo, but I am also probably more critical of him as well because I want him to succeed.

Of the 3 I would say Cole is the most talented of the bunch. He has a good kick and a nice side step.

 

[wce4premiership]

Yeah he’s a first round pick in his 6th year. Should really be imposing himself on games now. Bit disappointing

So was Sheppard though. Not every first round pick will be a game changer.

 

[FKASC]

So was Sheppard though. Not every first round pick will be a game changer.

That’s true but Sheppard was moved around the ground a lot more in his first few years. Duggan’s has a bit more time to settle

 

[Doashuey]

I don't think it's a fear of suspension thing. I think it's the way Simmo prefers us to play.

The Adelaide game over there last year we had 100 tackles in relatively sloppy conditions and after being down about 5 goals. I remember Simmo a few times that following week mentioning that tackles aren't a stat that's important to us, and saying that sort of footy isn't really sustainable over a whole season.

We maybe need to throw that thinking out the window for this month in the hub given the conditions.

Simmo probably needs to wake up because what we have dished up since 2019 is not sustainable, well at least not successful. If we are playing wet s**t conditions then it is a war and blokes need to tackle and pressure, not chip it around playing keepings off- the evidence is clear.

As much as I love Simmo, he is a bit pig headed with his game plans and is slow to adapt. In 2015 we had a great plan with the Web- until we got on a wide oval like the G and it was exposed. Yet it took another 2 seasons before he developed something else. Now last year, a lot of our plan of high possession high marking game was exposed in anything other than perfect conditions and again last Saturday. Its clear this lan only works in perfect conditions and yet we still wont get down nd dirty and tackle and pressure when conditions demand it. If we contine this way through this year and again next year then I can see Simmos position will be questioned.

 

[Ambrose Burnside]

As much as I love Simmo, he is a bit pig headed with his game plans and is slow to adapt. In 2015 we had a great plan with the Web- until we got on a wide oval like the G and it was exposed. Yet it took another 2 seasons before he developed something else.

To be fair, this sums up pretty much every coach.