James2
Senior List
In an earlier thread, many members of this forum expressed their outrage at the AFL's actions in regard to Fitzroy. Others have also condemned the AFL/VFL's handling of issues pertinent to the future of the game.
Few would argue that the decision to go national secured the League's future and that of many Victorian clubs. However, having done some research, I've been able to piece together a litany of stuff-ups, that placed the future of the national competition in doubt.
Unfortunately, this rant does not include all the facts, only those I could garner ffrom 3 (spare) hours at the National Library.
SYDNEY
1) In 1980, John Hennessy delivered a confidential report to the VFL entitled "The Sydney Solution: VFL at the Crossroads." In it, he projects that a team in Sydney could expect to make a $750,000 surplus within three years. Allen Aylett, who had long harboured a desire to see the VFL become a national competition, used the report as the basis for the relocation of South Melbourne to Sydney.
2) The Swans were launched with the help of a $400,000 loan, negotiated by the VFL. Although attendances were better then expected, the Swans'financial performance was very poor. By the end of 1982, the club wrote to CIGS Nominees- the company that provided the credit, seeking a deferment of the loan. By May 1983, the Swans had accrued a debt of $1.5 million, forcing the VFL to take control of the club.
3)In 1984, things began to turn around. Financial problems eased and the club won 6 of its first 9 games. In round 10, 26,000 fans attended a a games against Carlton. However, by the end of the year, the club has slumped to 10th. A collection of Sydney identities began to pursue avenues to save the club. They were paticularly enticed by the concept of private ownership as existed in the USA. They began discussions with the VFL.
4) Geoffery Edelsten and Basil Sellers tenderd offers with the VFL. As Edelsten continued to up the ante in a bid to gain the franchise, Sellers pulled out, convinced that the club could not break even. In addition, the Age newspaper approached the VFL with some damning information regarding Edelsten's business dealings. Edelsten had been under investigation from the ATO, the Coporate Affairs Commission has wound up two of his companies and were prosecuting five of his ten companies for failure to lodge documents. It is difficult to fathom, why the VFL sold the Swans to a man whose management of his other businesses could be considered sloppy, at best. Nevertheless, the Swans were sold to Edelsten for $6.5 million in July 1985.
5) In May 1988, Powerplay (Edelsten's comany) and its subsidiaries (including the Swans) went into liquidation after Telecom cut the office's phones. The Sydney licence was sold back to the VFL for $10. A consortium of local businessman, including Mike Willessee, joins forces to buy the club.
6) In 1990, Swans players are forced to take 20% pay cuts. In 1993, the consortium goes into liquidation forcing the AFL, to once again, take control of the club. In 1994, the club reverted to its present structure.
Not suprisingly, the initial projections of $750,000 surpluses failed to materialise. The relocation of South Melbourne is just one of a litany of stuff-ups made by the VFL/AFL, because they were guided by ideology, rather then common sense. Allen Aylett later admitted, that the scheme was insufficiently funded from the start.
BRISBANE
1) In 1986 the VFL Commission, sough tenders for two new teams- one in WA and one in Qld. The VFL received two tenders for the Qld team. One from a joint consortium lead by Paul Cronin and the QAFL and another from QLD businessman John Brown. The VFL Commission were attracted to Brown's offer, however changed their mind after they were "lead" to the belief that the Cronin syndicate would provide the $4 million licence fee up front, enabling many struggling Victorian clubs to stay afloat.
2) Many members of the Cronin syndicate got cold feet, when it came time to provide the cash. Cronin was short of cash. Enter Christopher Skase. Skase payed the licence fee, with money borrowed from the ANZ Bank. Sakse set up Queensland Merchant Holdings Ltd to operate his first foray into Australian Rules. In a bizarre move, the cub set up at Carrara on the Gold Coast rather than in Brisbane.
3) When Skases's Quintex Empire collapsed in November 1989, the Bears went under with debts of $27 million. It was discovered at this time, that the money Skase borrowed to buy the Bears, was still owed (in full) to the ANZ Bank.
4) The ANZ Bank and Cronin approached Gold Coast businessman Reuben Pellerman with an offer to buy the club. As evidence of the farce that was to become the Brisbane Bears, Cronin and the Bank, harrased Pellerman for days, including one discussion, just hours after major surgery"! Pellermen eventually "relented" and agreed to purchase the Bears. Cronin ignored the offer made by Andrew Ireland and Andrew Piper on behalf of another syndicate. Andrew Ireland was to become the Bears CEO and Piper, their Chairman.
5)When Pellerman took over the club, he found that everything (membership, signage etc) had been sold off. As he had no revenue, Pellerman had to meet the opeating costs with his own money. He sunk $3.3 million in 1990. At the end of 1991, the club reverted to a members based structure. In 1993, they finally relocated to Brisbane.
The mishandling of the expansion of the league, poses an interesting question:
1) If the AFL had based their decisions on common sense rather then ideology, would Fitzroy be the only Victorian club that no longer exists?
The VFL/AFL insists that their decisions were the only ones open. It is difficult to accept this arguement, when the process was riddled with poor planning, a lack of discussion and no studies into the varisty of the projetions they received.
If the AFL/VFL had no been so rushed, the fiascos in Brisbane and Sydney, which nearly floored any oppurtunity of an AFL club establishing itself in an important market, could have been avoided.
------------------
"Be not afraid of greatness."
Shakespeare, Twelfth Night.
Few would argue that the decision to go national secured the League's future and that of many Victorian clubs. However, having done some research, I've been able to piece together a litany of stuff-ups, that placed the future of the national competition in doubt.
Unfortunately, this rant does not include all the facts, only those I could garner ffrom 3 (spare) hours at the National Library.
SYDNEY
1) In 1980, John Hennessy delivered a confidential report to the VFL entitled "The Sydney Solution: VFL at the Crossroads." In it, he projects that a team in Sydney could expect to make a $750,000 surplus within three years. Allen Aylett, who had long harboured a desire to see the VFL become a national competition, used the report as the basis for the relocation of South Melbourne to Sydney.
2) The Swans were launched with the help of a $400,000 loan, negotiated by the VFL. Although attendances were better then expected, the Swans'financial performance was very poor. By the end of 1982, the club wrote to CIGS Nominees- the company that provided the credit, seeking a deferment of the loan. By May 1983, the Swans had accrued a debt of $1.5 million, forcing the VFL to take control of the club.
3)In 1984, things began to turn around. Financial problems eased and the club won 6 of its first 9 games. In round 10, 26,000 fans attended a a games against Carlton. However, by the end of the year, the club has slumped to 10th. A collection of Sydney identities began to pursue avenues to save the club. They were paticularly enticed by the concept of private ownership as existed in the USA. They began discussions with the VFL.
4) Geoffery Edelsten and Basil Sellers tenderd offers with the VFL. As Edelsten continued to up the ante in a bid to gain the franchise, Sellers pulled out, convinced that the club could not break even. In addition, the Age newspaper approached the VFL with some damning information regarding Edelsten's business dealings. Edelsten had been under investigation from the ATO, the Coporate Affairs Commission has wound up two of his companies and were prosecuting five of his ten companies for failure to lodge documents. It is difficult to fathom, why the VFL sold the Swans to a man whose management of his other businesses could be considered sloppy, at best. Nevertheless, the Swans were sold to Edelsten for $6.5 million in July 1985.
5) In May 1988, Powerplay (Edelsten's comany) and its subsidiaries (including the Swans) went into liquidation after Telecom cut the office's phones. The Sydney licence was sold back to the VFL for $10. A consortium of local businessman, including Mike Willessee, joins forces to buy the club.
6) In 1990, Swans players are forced to take 20% pay cuts. In 1993, the consortium goes into liquidation forcing the AFL, to once again, take control of the club. In 1994, the club reverted to its present structure.
Not suprisingly, the initial projections of $750,000 surpluses failed to materialise. The relocation of South Melbourne is just one of a litany of stuff-ups made by the VFL/AFL, because they were guided by ideology, rather then common sense. Allen Aylett later admitted, that the scheme was insufficiently funded from the start.
BRISBANE
1) In 1986 the VFL Commission, sough tenders for two new teams- one in WA and one in Qld. The VFL received two tenders for the Qld team. One from a joint consortium lead by Paul Cronin and the QAFL and another from QLD businessman John Brown. The VFL Commission were attracted to Brown's offer, however changed their mind after they were "lead" to the belief that the Cronin syndicate would provide the $4 million licence fee up front, enabling many struggling Victorian clubs to stay afloat.
2) Many members of the Cronin syndicate got cold feet, when it came time to provide the cash. Cronin was short of cash. Enter Christopher Skase. Skase payed the licence fee, with money borrowed from the ANZ Bank. Sakse set up Queensland Merchant Holdings Ltd to operate his first foray into Australian Rules. In a bizarre move, the cub set up at Carrara on the Gold Coast rather than in Brisbane.
3) When Skases's Quintex Empire collapsed in November 1989, the Bears went under with debts of $27 million. It was discovered at this time, that the money Skase borrowed to buy the Bears, was still owed (in full) to the ANZ Bank.
4) The ANZ Bank and Cronin approached Gold Coast businessman Reuben Pellerman with an offer to buy the club. As evidence of the farce that was to become the Brisbane Bears, Cronin and the Bank, harrased Pellerman for days, including one discussion, just hours after major surgery"! Pellermen eventually "relented" and agreed to purchase the Bears. Cronin ignored the offer made by Andrew Ireland and Andrew Piper on behalf of another syndicate. Andrew Ireland was to become the Bears CEO and Piper, their Chairman.
5)When Pellerman took over the club, he found that everything (membership, signage etc) had been sold off. As he had no revenue, Pellerman had to meet the opeating costs with his own money. He sunk $3.3 million in 1990. At the end of 1991, the club reverted to a members based structure. In 1993, they finally relocated to Brisbane.
The mishandling of the expansion of the league, poses an interesting question:
1) If the AFL had based their decisions on common sense rather then ideology, would Fitzroy be the only Victorian club that no longer exists?
The VFL/AFL insists that their decisions were the only ones open. It is difficult to accept this arguement, when the process was riddled with poor planning, a lack of discussion and no studies into the varisty of the projetions they received.
If the AFL/VFL had no been so rushed, the fiascos in Brisbane and Sydney, which nearly floored any oppurtunity of an AFL club establishing itself in an important market, could have been avoided.
------------------
"Be not afraid of greatness."
Shakespeare, Twelfth Night.
