- Sep 18, 2013
- AFL Club
Some make that choice more than others.........
You don't have to be a complete classless campaigner about it.
I never said they were never planning to in 1943, but by mounting a smaller invasion, as German archival evidence proves, the Germans believed that the landings were a feint right up to the afternoon on June 6. They believed that Calias was the main target still, delaying most of the panzer divisions in Northern France by a good day, despite Panzer Lehr Division being ready to move out against the Allies moving inland. Hitler's interference with German high command was also a main factor behind their delay. If the allies invaded Normandy in 1943, they would have had it a lot easier in terms of defences, but Rommel's appointment led to the defences in Normandy by mid 1944 being bolstered through the Todt organisation and other labour detachments.
The small scale of the landings in 1944 were to minimalise causalities to a degree, but also to tie down the large German reserves in France that could have been devoted to the Italian and Eastern Fronts. Also by 1943, the Allies hadn't fully worn down the Luftwaffe, which the Allies concentrated on from mid 1943 to 1944, which helped the 1944 landings immensely.
If the Western Allies used 270 divisions in 1943 they would have won out in the end, because the state of the defences in Normandy, but they may have suffered similiar to higher causalities to the 1944 campaign, due to increased German air and panzer reserves as well as their control of the ports.
The 1944 landings and their smaller scale weren't about simply bleeding the Russians (they did that with Berlin in 1945 however and a few other situations/battles from 1944-45), but to tie down badly needed German reserves that were needed on the Eastern and Italian Fronts, minimalising causalities and taking full advantage of their aerial and naval power, which they did to great effect.
Being a classless campaigner is a choice.
That must of hurt.