Travel Boeing 737 MAX issues

[SHAKESPEARE]

Ok, so pilot error.

 

[Art Corvelay]

Ok, so pilot error.

Hardly pilot error if Boeing downplayed the differences to carriers so, AND have made code changes to the new systems.

 

[Admiral Byng]

But if the pilots were trained, then this wouldn't be an issue?

If this particular model of 737 needs a specific type rating and separate training it means that airlines face a greater switching cost in placing new orders. So they might start looking at other options.

 

[Bomberboyokay]

 

[Gralin]

Can't help that making safety features an add on and those features not being required to fly is a bad idea

Not explaining changes to your systems to avoid training costs also a bad idea

greed strikes again

 

[Zidane98]

Shocked at how badly Boeing botched this MCAS system. Only uses data from a single AOA sensor (using data from multiple sensors much safer). A false AOA signal triggers a stall warning / stick shaker on the control column. Which in turn masks the sound of the trim motors moving and distracts pilots from observing the trim wheels moving. The system trims nose down more in response to the pilot pulling back (it thinks the plane is stalled). What killed both crews in the latest crashes was they increased airspeed to a point where the dive caused by MCAS couldn't be countered by the pilot pulling up.

Simple fix is to accept data from multiple AOA sensors and if there are differing valutes disable the MCAS system until maintenance fixes the sensors for the next flight.

Lawyers for ET302 / JT610 victims are going to have a field day.

 

[CD Xbow]

I am sickened by Boeings disinformation about their little 'software error'.

Basically every step of the development of the MAX is f***ed. It started way before the mis-implementation of MCAS

1. Putting bigger engines that don't fit properly on an aging aircraft that has already modified multiple times (to avoid costs/time of recertification)
2. The engines have to be put further forward because they don't fit under the wing.
3. This destabilizes the aircraft, so with engine power it tends to pulls the nose up and increases the likelihood of a stall

Now at this point you would expect some engineers, somewhere in the process to come forward and say, hey this is a really bad idea. I don't know if they did but I'm sure someone would of. I expect there was an argument but the bean counters won.

4. Boeing implement a software fix (MCAS), an automated system in place that pushes the nose down if the AoA becomes to high, it will make the Max handle like 737 too, so also avoid costly recertification.
5. MCAS is implemented using input from a single AoA sensor- OMG Boeing introduced a single point of failure, willingly, knowingly and deliberately.
6. MCAS is kept a dirty little secret from pilots - it's not on the training manual, nor any feedback on their display.

So, Boeing is making it look like it's just a little software error, it's not, it's really f***ed engineering every step of the way. It's what happens when dollars count more than safety. Boeing should have grounded the craft after the first crash, they would have very quickly known what caused it from the nature of the event. Trump provided cover for Boeing and the FAA in this, both need to be thoroughly investigated.

 

[TheUnit1]

If it’s Boeing I ain’t going - 777 the exception

 

[Art Corvelay]

I am sickened by Boeings disinformation about their little 'software error'.

Yeah, from further reading since my last posts Boeing have really downplayed what’s occurred here. They’ve really pushed the limits on the 737 design.