Play Nice The NM Devil's Chessboard Thread - Part II

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Hopefully all or most of this is interesting for most...













The U.S. Navy’s last successful comparable surface shipbuilding program was the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate. The final ship of that class, the USS Ingraham, was commissioned in 1989.

Herein lies the danger inherent with unrealistic acquisition programs. When service leaders convince themselves that a radical design will work before the concept is actually demonstrated in the real world, they commit themselves, potentially for decades, to a program that may fail. By spending so much time and money on the Littoral Combat Ship program, the U.S. Navy squandered 40 years of shipbuilding time. That is an enormous lost opportunity cost and now our hard-pressed sailors enduring extended deployments are paying the price.





Advocates for Artemis insist that the program is more than Apollo 2.0. But as we’ll see, Artemis can't even measure up to Apollo 1.0. It costs more, does less, flies less frequently, and exposes crews to risks that the steely-eyed missile men of the Apollo era found unacceptable. It's as if Ford in 2024 released a new model car that was slower, more accident-prone, and ten times more expensive than the Model T.

When a next-generation lunar program can’t meet the cost, performance, or safety standards set three generations earlier, something has gone seriously awry.







Israel lobbied the United States for greater access to PGMs in the wake of its 2014 assault on Gaza that left some 2,200 Palestinians dead. The Israeli government argued that it needed more smart bombs to use against Hamas and Hezbollah in case of emergency. Section 1275 of the 2021 NDAA was seemingly meant to fulfill that request, enabling the president to bypass normal weapons spending caps on transfers of PGMs already stored in U.S. reserves.

“Although it is almost impossible for independent experts to trace due to a lack of basic transparency, there is little doubt that Israel and the U.S. took advantage of the provision,” says William Hartung, senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. “The whole purpose of doing it in this fashion is to hide the extent of these deadly transfers — and the mechanisms used to carry them out — from public view.”




 
Two of the best and most relevant pieces I've read on the art and science of attritional warfare...the second, RUSI piece is probably the best analysis I've seen out of a Western think tank on this subject.




Attritional wars require their own ‘Art of War’ and are fought with a ‘force-centric’ approach, unlike wars of manoeuvre which are ‘terrain-focused’. They are rooted in massive industrial capacity to enable the replacement of losses, geographical depth to absorb a series of defeats, and technological conditions that prevent rapid ground movement. In attritional wars, military operations are shaped by a state’s ability to replace losses and generate new formations, not tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than gaining terrain is most likely to win.

The West is not prepared for this kind of war. To most Western experts, attritional strategy is counterintuitive. Historically, the West preferred the short ‘winner takes all’ clash of professional armies. Recent war games such as CSIS’s war over Taiwan covered one month of fighting. The possibility that the war would go on never entered the discussion. This is a reflection of a common Western attitude. Wars of attrition are treated as exceptions, something to be avoided at all costs and generally products of leaders’ ineptitude.

Unfortunately, wars between near-peer powers are likely to be attritional, thanks to a large pool of resources available to replace initial losses. The attritional nature of combat, including the erosion of professionalism due to casualties, levels the battlefield no matter which army started with better trained forces. As conflict drags on, the war is won by economies, not armies. States that grasp this and fight such a war via an attritional strategy aimed at exhausting enemy resources while preserving their own are more likely to win. The fastest way to lose a war of attrition is to focus on manoeuvre, expending valuable resources on near-term territorial objectives. Recognising that wars of attrition have their own art is vital to winning them without sustaining crippling losses.

The Economic Dimension

Wars of attrition are won by economies enabling mass mobilisation of militaries via their industrial sectors. Armies expand rapidly during such a conflict, requiring massive quantities of armoured vehicles, drones, electronic products, and other combat equipment. Because high-end weaponry is very complex to manufacture and consumes vast resources, a high-low mixture of forces and weapons is imperative in order to win.

High-end weapons have exceptional performance but are difficult to manufacture, especially when needed to arm a rapidly mobilised army subjected to a high rate of attrition. For example, during the Second World War German Panzers were superb tanks, but using approximately the same production resources, the Soviets rolled out eight T-34s for every German Panzer. The difference in performance did not justify the numerical disparity in production. High-end weapons also require high-end troops. These take significant time to train – time which is unavailable in a war with high attrition rates.

It is easier and faster to produce large numbers of cheap weapons and munitions, especially if their subcomponents are interchangeable with civilian goods, ensuring mass quantity without the expansion of production lines. New recruits also absorb simpler weapons faster, allowing rapid generation of new formations or the reconstitution of existing ones.
Achieving mass is difficult for higher-end Western economies. To achieve hyper-efficiency, they shed excess capacity and struggle to rapidly expand, especially since lower-tier industries have been transferred abroad for economic reasons. During war, global supply chains are disrupted and subcomponents can no longer be secured. Added to this conundrum is the lack of a skilled workforce with experience in a particular industry. These skills are acquired over decades, and once an industry is shuttered it takes decades to rebuild.


 

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Between this and the ongoing shitshow of the Francis Scott Key bridge disaster, US competence and capability is taking a huge hit.

Is this the pier they built to supply aid to Gaza because the Israelis aren’t letting anything in? How the f*k is Biden not in a position to demand they open them? Think about the additional coast to the us taxpayer.
 
Is this the pier they built to supply aid to Gaza because the Israelis aren’t letting anything in? How the f*k is Biden not in a position to demand they open them? Think about the additional coast to the us taxpayer.

Yep, that's the one lol.
 
Any more hints Rishi is throwing the elections?
Calling for compulsory national service.

Pommy mate of mine reckons a lot of the EU leaders think Putin is going to provoke a bigger war, so things like this are about softening the public opposition to 'national service' and a potential draft. Even if it loses them this election, it's put the possibility of mandatory service back into the public consciousness.

Bit tin foil hat if you ask me. But interesting to ponder.
 

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Wow, in the realms of barefaced bullshit to try and use "tHe RuSsSiAnS" to smear someone, this is a new low.

There certainly are intelligence agencies with blood on their hands from Omagh - most notably the Brits and to lesser extent the Irish (although they are still complicit).

This is just disgusting
 
Pommy mate of mine reckons a lot of the EU leaders think Putin is going to provoke a bigger war, so things like this are about softening the public opposition to 'national service' and a potential draft. Even if it loses them this election, it's put the possibility of mandatory service back into the public consciousness.

Bit tin foil hat if you ask me. But interesting to ponder.

Nah, its a desperate attempt to save the furniture by dragging some hard right older voters back from Reform.
 
Pommy mate of mine reckons a lot of the EU leaders think Putin is going to provoke a bigger war, so things like this are about softening the public opposition to 'national service' and a potential draft. Even if it loses them this election, it's put the possibility of mandatory service back into the public consciousness.

Bit tin foil hat if you ask me. But interesting to ponder.
Getting 18 year olds to do a weekend of vountary work in the community isn't a bad thing. Pretty necessary after the Tories gutted society even.
 
Getting 18 year olds to do a weekend of vountary work in the community isn't a bad thing.

Apart from no, the state shouldn't be telling 18 year olds what they can and can't do with their free time (especially when many will be working to try and make some money while they study) unless this program is ultra well funded and thought through, its a waste of time.

And a very well funded one starts looking worryingly fashy, especially in contemporary Britain.

Pretty necessary after the Tories gutted society even.

Then the answer should be to raise taxes and rebuild stuff, not arbitrarily rob one generation of youth of even more of their youth post lockdwon.

Lots of British young people saying nah we did our national service during lockdown to protect the oldies and they're right.

This is an excellent read on the kind of cultural mindset Sunak is trying to appeal to:

 

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